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EX POST FACTO LIMITATIONS ON CHANGES IN
EVIDENTIARY LAW: REPEAL OF ACCOMPLICE
CORROBORATION REQUIREMENTS
INTRODUCTION
The ex post facto clauses' in the Constitution prohibit the passage of
retroactive penal laws. Although this prohibition always has been held to
apply to retroactive changes in the substantive elements of criminal of-
fenses and the punishments prescribed for them,2 courts have had trouble
deciding the extent to which legislative changes in the law of criminal
procedure can be applied retroactively, that is, in trials for crimes com-
mitted before such changes were enacted. The Supreme Court recently
clarified its approach to this issue in Dobbert v. Florida3 and Weaver v.
Graham,' stating simply that the ex post facto clauses do not apply to
matters of procedure.5 In Weaver, however, the Court restated its long-
standing dictum that certain procedural changes may act in such a way
as to bring them within the ambit of the constitutional prohibition.6
Among the procedural changes that recently have come under attack
on ex post facto grounds is the repeal of statutes prohibiting a conviction
based on an accomplice's testimony unless the testimony was corrobo-
rated by other evidence.' This evidentiary requirement has fallen into
disfavor over the last decade, and many of the state statutes that had
imposed it have been repealed.' Several courts have held that the retro-
active application of the repeal of an accomplice corroboration require-
ment runs afoul of the constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws.'
1. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 & U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see infra notes 12-17
for the text of these provisions and discussion of the meaning of the term ex post facto
laws.
2. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884); see also infra notes 38-39 and accom-
panying text (discussing the two fundamental types of ex post facto law).
3. 432 U.S. 282 (1977).
4. 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
5. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 n.12 (1981); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S.
282, 292-94 (1977).
6. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 n.12 (1981) ("Alteration of a substantial
right . . . is not merely procedural, even if the statute takes a seemingly procedural
form."); see also Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 590 (1896) ("[L]egislature[s] may
not under the guise of establishing modes of procedure and prescribing remedies violate
the ... ex post facto [clauses]."); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884) (certain changes
to the rules of evidence may violate the ex post facto prohibition).
7. See e.g., Murphy v. Sowders, 801 F.2d 205, 207 (6th Cir. 1986) (repeal of Ky. R.
Crim. P. § 9.62), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 1593 (1987); Government of the Virgin Islands
v. Civil, 591 F.2d 255, 257-58 (3d Cir. 1979) (repeal of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 17); State
v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1217-18 (Utah 1986) (repeal of Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-
18). For a discussion of accomplice corroboration requirements, see infra notes 62-83
and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
9. See, eg., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Civil, 591 F.2d 255, 259 (3d Cir.
1979); Hart v. State, 40 Ala. 32, 35 (1866); State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Utah
1986).
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They base their holdings on an ancient but oft-quoted Supreme Court
dictum suggesting that any law retroactively altering the "amount or de-
gree of proof" necessary to convict violates the ex post facto clauses.' 0
Other courts disregard this dictum and hold that the opposite result is
consistent with the Supreme Court's ex post facto decisions."
This Note proposes that retroactive application of an evidentiary
change does not violate the ex post facto prohibition unless it acts in such
a way as to change the substantive elements of a crime. Judged by this
standard, the repeal of an accomplice corroboration requirement does
not violate the ex post facto clauses. Part I of this Note traces the history
of the ex post facto clauses and the Supreme Court's approach to ex post
facto challenges to changes in procedural law. Part II examines the his-
tory and nature of accomplice corroboration requirements. Part III dis-
cusses the lower courts' treatment of whether the retroactive application
of the repeal of accomplice corroboration requirements violates the ex
post facto prohibition and concludes that such application does not con-
stitute an ex post facto violation.
I. THE Ex POST FACTO CLAUSES
The ex post facto clauses in the Constitution prohibit the passage of ex
post facto laws by the federal and state legislatures.12 The term "ex post
facto law" would literally refer to any law, criminal or civil, which gives
legal consequences to actions or events that took place before the date of
its passage. 3 The clauses, however, have been interpreted to prohibit
10. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589-90 (1884).
11. See Murphy v. Sowders, 801 F.2d 205, 209-10 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 1593 (1987); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 69, 72-73 (Ky. 1983).
12. Article I, § 9 of the Constitution applies to the federal government and provides
that "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." U.S. Const. art I, § 9,
cl. 3. Article I, § 10 applies to the states and provides that: "No State shall ... pass any
Bill of Attainder, [or] ex post facto Law .... " U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 cl. 1.
The term "ex post facto laws" in these two provisions has been construed to have the
same meaning, and cases interpreting one are cited freely as authority in opinions involv-
ing the other. See Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to What Constitutes an Ex Post
Facto Law Prohibited by Federal Constitution, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1146, 1150 (1978). Compare,
e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 322-28 (1867) (invalidating state law
on ex post facto and bill of attainder grounds) with Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
333, 377-78 (1867) (invalidating analogous federal law on same grounds: "the argument
presented in [Cummings] is equally applicable to the act of Congress under consideration
in this case").
For general commentary on the ex post facto clauses, see J. Nowak, R. Rotunda, & J.
Young, Constitutional Law § 11.9(b) (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter Nowak, Rotunda &
Young]; L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 10-2, 10-3 (1978); Crosskey, The
True Meaning of the Constitutional Prohibition of Ex-Post-Facto Laws, 14 U. Chi. L. Rev.
539 (1947); Field, Ex Post Facto in the Constitution, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 315 (1922); McAl-
lister, Ex Post Facto Laws in the Supreme Court of the United States, 15 Calif. L. Rev. 269
(1927).
13. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 48, 77, 6 Cranch 87, 138 (1810); Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. 305, 308, 3 Dall. 386, 390 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.); Crosskey, supra note 12, at
539.
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only legislative acts 4 that operate to the detriment'" of a criminal de-
fendant16 whose alleged crime was committed before the date of
enactment. 
17
The Framers' aversion to ex post facto laws was based on their notion
of the inherent limits of legislative power. 8 Some of the delegates to the
constitutional convention perceived such legislation as so contrary to the
basic principles of republican government that they doubted whether it
was necessary to include an explicit prohibition. 9 But the generation
14. The ex post facto clauses only apply to acts of the Congress and the state legisla-
tures. See, eg., Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977), Frank v. Mangum, 237
U.S. 309, 344 (1915); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 161 (1913); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S.
48, 77, 6 Cranch 87, 138 (1810); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 305, 308, 3 Dall. 386, 389-90
(1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). They apply to every form in which legislative power may
be exerted, including constitutions, constitutional amendments, municipal ordinances,
and any act of any instrumentality of the state exercising delegated legislative authority.
Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 162-63 (1913). Retroactive acts of the judiciary that unfor-
seeably enlarge the meaning of a criminal statute may be void under the due process
clause. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-55 (1964).
15. In order for an act to violate the ex post facto prohibition, it must operate to the
disadvantage of the defendant. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981); Dobbert
v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294 (1977); Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937);
Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 325 (1905); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 305, 309, 3
Dall. 386, 390 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.).
The Supreme Court does not look at the impact that a change has on a particular
defendant, but at the overall effect of the challenged law. See Weaver v. Graham, 450
U.S. 24, 33 (1981) ("[Ex post facto] inquiry looks to the challenged provision, and not to
... its effect on the particular individual."); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294 (1977)
(Court looks at the new procedure in toto, rather than to any effect that it may have had
on the defendant challenging it).
16. It is well settled that the ex post facto prohibition applies only to acts of criminal
or penal legislation. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 n.4 (1954); Baltimore &
S.R.R. v. Nesbit, 51 U.S. 416, 423, 10 How. 395, 402 (1850); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 305,
313-14, 3 Dall. 386, 396-97 (1798) (opinion of Paterson, J.). But see Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594-95 (1952) (questioning this rule); Satterlee v. Matthew-
son, 27 U.S. 242, 264 & n.(a), 2 Peters 380, 416 & n.(a) at 415-16e (1829) (Johnson, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the ex post facto clauses should also be applied to civil legisla-
tion); Crosskey, supra note 12, passim (arguing that at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, the clauses generally were understood also to refer to civil legislation);
Note, Ex Post Facto Limitations on Legislative Power, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 1491, 1505 (1975)
[hereinafter Ex Post Facto Limitations] (arguing that any law that attempts to influence
behavior through the threat of some detriment should be subject to the ex post facto
prohibition). A law that is civil in form, but punitive in effect, also will violate the ex post
facto prohibition. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 327 (1867).
17. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981).
18. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 307 & n.8 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); J.
Madison, Journal of the Federal Convention 586 (E. Scott ed. 1970); The Federalist No.
44, at 297 (J. Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898).
19. The inclusion of the ex post facto clauses in the Constitution was not extensively
debated at the federal convention, nor were the reasons for the prohibition discussed.
The delegates seem to have taken it for granted that it would be inherently beyond the
power of the legislatures to pass ex post facto laws. In fact, some of the delegates argued
that the provisions were superfluous. See Madison, supra note 18, at 586. "Mr. Ells-
worth contended that there was no lawyer, no[r] civilian, who would not say that ex post
facto laws were void of themselves. It cannot, then, be necessary to prohibit them." Id.
Another delegate felt that the inclusion of the clauses would "bring reflections on the
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that saw the ratification of the Constitution wanted to prevent the polit-
ical abuses to which ex post facto laws could be put. In a number of
well-known historical incidents, the British Parliament had passed bills
of attainder 2 or ex post facto laws to ensure the conviction of political
opponents.2' These incidents were referred to by the pamphleteers who
argued for ratification of the Constitution, 22 and by the Supreme Court in
its first ex post facto case. 3 Thus, the inclusion of the prohibition on ex
post facto laws and bills of attainder was meant to uphold the separation
of powers by preventing improper legislative interference in the judicial
process.24
Constitution, and proclaim that we are ignorant of the first principles of legislation, or are
constituting a government that will be so." Id. But see Crosskey, The Ex-Post-Facto and
the Contracts Clauses in the Federal Convention: A Note on the Editorial Ingenuity of
James Madison, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 248, 250-51 (1968) (arguing that Madison's notes do
not accurately reflect the controversy over the meaning of the ex post facto prohibition).
20. Bills of attainder are legislative acts that summarily convict a person or class of
persons without the procedural safeguards of a formal judicial proceeding. See Nowak,
Rotunda & Young, supra note 12, § 11.9(c), at 394. The constitutional prohibition of
bills of attainder proscribes any legislative act "no matter what [its] form, that appl[ies]
either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way
as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial." United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303, 315 (1946). The constitutional ban encompasses what had been called bills of
attainder, where the punishment imposed was capital, and bills of pains and penalties,
where lesser penalties were imposed. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,
323 (1867); Nowak, Rotunda & Young, supra note 12, § 11.9(c), at 394; L. Tribe, supra
note 12, § 10-4, at 484-85; Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Sug-
gested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 Yale L.J. 330, 331 & n.5, 334 (1962)
[hereinafter The Bounds of Legislative Specification].
In Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867), and Exparte Garland, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 333 (1867), the Supreme Court held that laws imposing severe professional
disabilities on those who could not swear an oath that they had not participated in the
confederate cause in the Civil War violated the constitutional prohibition of bills of at-
tainder and ex post facto laws. Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323-28, Garland, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377-78. Modem bill of attainder cases have concerned legislative
persecution of members of the communist party. Compare United States v. Brown, 381
U.S. 437 (1965) (law that made it illegal for a member of the communist party to hold
office in a labor union invalidated as a bill of attainder) with Garner v, Board of Pub.
Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (law that required employees to take an oath that they had
never been members of the communist party upheld as establishing legitimate eligibility
requirements for public employment). For general discussion of bills of attainder, see Z.
Chafee, Three Human Rights in the Constitution 90-161 (1956); Nowak, Rotunda &
Young, supra note 12, § 11.9(c); The Bounds of Legislative Specification, supra.
21. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 305, 308, 3 Dall. 386, 389 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.).
The legislatures of several of the newly independent states also had passed ex post facto
laws. See id. 3 Dall. at 389; Crosskey, supra note 12, at 540-41.
22. See The Federalist No. 44, at 296-97 (J. Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898); The Feder-
alist No. 84, at 571 (A. Hamilton) (P. Ford ed. 1898); Coxe, An Examination of the
Constitution, in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States; Published During its
Discussion by the People 1787-1788 133, 147 (P. Ford ed. 1968).
23. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 305, 307-08, 3 Dal]. 386, 389 (1798) (opinion of Chase,
J.); id. at 316, 3 Dall. at 399-400 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
24. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 n.10 (1981) (ex post facto prohibition
"upholds the separation of powers by confining the legislature to penal decisions with
prospective effect and the judiciary and executive to applications of existing penal law"
(citing Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 272, 277 (1804))); Cummings v. Missouri,
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Although the historical purpose of the ex post facto prohibition to re-
strain the legislatures has long been acknowledged,25 only recently has
the Supreme Court begun to elucidate its more theoretical underpin-
nings.26 The Court decided its earliest ex post facto cases without pro-
viding a rationale for its holdings. In Calder v. Bull,27 the first Supreme
Court case to construe the clauses, Justice Chase stated simply that ex
post facto laws were contrary to the first principles of government and
susceptible to abuse for improper purposes.28 His opinion then enumer-
ated several historical incidents in which the British Parliament had used
ex post facto legislation to convict people for political reasons29 and listed
corresponding3° types of laws that would be prohibited as ex post facto.3"
Later, the Court referred to this list as a kind of catalogue of possible ex
post facto violations, without developing a strong theoretical ground-
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867) (bill of attainder is a legislative act that inflicts punish-
ment without a judicial trial); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 305, 307, 3 Dall. 386, 388 (1798)
(legislatures prohibited from passing ex post facto laws because these were thought to be
an "exercise of judicial power") (opinion of Chase, J.); Prater v. United States Parole
Comm'n, 802 F.2d 948, 952 (7th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (rule against ex post facto laws is
based on desire "to keep legislatures out of the business-which is judicial business-of
punishing people"); The Federalist No. 78 at 530 (A. Hamilton) (P. Ford ed. 1898); L.
Tribe, supra note 12 § 10-5, at 491.
25. See. ag., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 48, 77, 6 Cranch 87, 138 (1810); Calder v. Bull,
3 U.S. 305, 306-07, 3 Dall. 386, 388-90 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.).
26. In Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981), the Court stated that the ex post facto
prohibition was meant to ensure that individuals would have fair warning of legislative
enactments so that they may act in reliance thereon, and to restrain the legislatures from
arbitrary and vindictive acts. See id, at 28-29; see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282,
297 (1977) (statute did not violate the ex post facto prohibition because defendant had
fair warning that the act he committed was criminal and what punishment would be
imposed for it). The authorities cited in Weaver for the factors of fair warning and reli-
ance are Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 298, and two older cases, Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221,
229 (1883), and Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 305, 306, 3 Dall. 386, 387 (1798). Explicit refer-
ence to fair warning and reliance, however, did not enter the Supreme Court's ex post
facto jurisprudence until Dobbert and Weaver. The Court's citation to Kring and Calder
can only be described as creative.
27. 3 U.S. 305, 3 Dall. 386 (1798) (Justices Chase, Paterson and Iredell delivered
opinions seriatim).
28. See 3 U.S. 305, 307, 3 Dall. 386, 388-89 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.).
29. 3 U.S. 305, 307-08, 3 Dall. 386, 389 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.).
30. Justice Chase discussed the circumstances of four historical incidents in which the
British Parliament had passed ex post facto laws, see id at 307-08, 3 Dall. at 389, and
several paragraphs later listed four types of laws that would violate the ex post facto
prohibition. See id at 309, 3 Dall. at 390-91. This list corresponds closely to the types of
action Parliament had taken in the historical incidents enumerated.
31. In Calder, Justice Chase stated what he considered to be ex post facto laws:
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every
law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed.
3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment,
than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters
the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony, than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the
offender.
Id. at 309, 3 Dal. at 390.
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work for the constitutional prohibition.32 As a result, the Supreme
Court's case law on the ex post facto clauses developed as a series of fact-
specific precedents that often addressed arcane legislative changes un-
likely to recur."
In a recent case, Weaver v. Graham,34 the Court noted three reasons
for the ban on ex post facto laws. First, it ensures that citizens are given
fair warning of what acts will be penalized and to what extent. 35 Second,
32. See, e.g., Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 183-84 (1915) (quoting list in its
entirety); Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 593-94 (1901) (same); Gibson v. Mis-
sissippi, 162 U.S. 565, 589-90 (1896) (paraphrasing list); Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S.
377, 382 (1894) (paraphrasing list without citing Calder); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S.
221, 228 (1883) (quoting list in its entirety); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
277, 325-26 (1867) (paraphrasing list without citing to Calder).
33. See, e.g., Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380 (1898) (change in method of prov-
ing handwriting evidence); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898) (change in number ofjurors and degree of unanimity required, occurring when Utah went from territorial sta-
tus to statehood); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883) (new law changed provision
that had barred prosecution for first-degree murder on retrial after reversal of earlier
conviction on plea of guilty to second-degree murder); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 277 (1867) (sanctions imposed against participants in the Confederate war effort).
Kring is the principal Supreme Court precedent for the defeat of a procedural change
on ex post facto grounds. The rationale for the holding, however, was unclear, and later
courts, including the Supreme Court itself, had trouble making analogies to the Kring
facts. For example, in Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884), the Court dismissed the com-
plicated facts of the Kring case by saying simply that there were "no such features in the
case before us," without giving any indication what features it was referring to. Id. at
588.
34. 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
35. See id. at 28-29. The ban on ex post facto legislation reflects the pluralistic nature
of our society. In a population with a heterogeneous religious and ethical background,
people cannot be assumed to share notions of right and wrong. See Warren v. United
States Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d 183, 188 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
950 (1982); Ex Post Facto Limitations, supra note 16, at 1500 n.34. In such a society, it
would be unfair to subject someone to criminal liability for an action unless she has been
put on notice, at least constructively, see infra note 154, that such action will be regarded
as culpable. See Warren v. United States Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d 183, 188 n.22 (D.C.
Cir. 198 1), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982); Ex Post Facto Limitations, supra note 16, at
1501 n.34. The ex post facto prohibition would thus seem to foreclose any possibility that
penal sanctions could be imposed as a matter of common law.
Ironically, although the ex post facto prohibition may reflect the Framers' recognition
that ideas of criminality are neither inherent nor universal, their arguments in favor of
the ex post facto clauses were grounded almost entirely in notions of natural law. See
Lewis, Anti-Federalists Versus Federalists: Selected Documents 50-51 (1967) (pointing
out that although the authors of The Federalist made most of their arguments on the
basis of practical principles, their arguments in favor of the ex post facto clauses were
based on natural law (citing to The Federalist No. 44 (J. Madison))).
There may be acts so universally regarded as heinous that it is fair to punish them even
though they were not proscribed by any positive law in effect at the time they were com-
mitted. Such would seem to be the case with regard to certain acts of international bellig-
erence and so-called war crimes. See Warren v. United States Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d
183, 188 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982); Ex Post Facto Limita-
tions, supra note 16, at 1500 n.34. The convictions at Nuremburg were based primarily
on the application of universal law. In Warren v. United States Parole Comm'n, 659
F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982), the court stated:
To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties and assur-
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it protects the right of citizens to choose their actions in reasonable reli-
ance on existing laws, without fear that the laws will be changed capri-
ciously or maliciously.36 Third, the ban prevents arbitrary or vindictive
acts on the part of the legislature.37
ances have attacked neighbouring states without warning is obviously untrue,
for in such circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and
so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were
allowed to go unpunished.
659 F.2d at 188 n.22 (quoting In re Goering, 1946 Ann. Dig. (13 Int'l Rep.) 203, 208
(Int'l Milit. Trib.)); see also Ex Post Facto Limitations, supra note 16, at 1497 n. 19 (same
quotation); Hentoff, Profiles (Cardinal O'Connor Part I), The New Yorker, March 23,
1987 at 59, 72-73 (discussing natural or universal law and stating that the judgments at
Nuremberg were based on this type of unwritten law). The attempt of the Confederate
States to secede from the Union, it would seem, did not reach this level. The Supreme
Court used the constitutional prohibition on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws to
restrain the Congress and state legislatures from penalizing those who had supported the
rebel cause. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, passim (1867); Exparte
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377-78 (1867).
36. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981).
37. See id at 29; Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 183 (1915). The relatively
recent addition of the factors of fair warning and reliance to the Supreme Court's ex post
facto jurisprudence suggests that these factors were not prominent in the minds of the
Framers, who seemed concerned almost exclusively with preventing improperly moti-
vated legislation. In Warren v. United States Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir.
1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982), the court wrote: "From the outset... the ex
post facto clauses have been understood to have been principally aimed at curtailing legis-
lative abuses." Id at 187. See Note, Ex Post Facto Limitations, supra note 16, at 1501.
By requiring that criminal laws apply only prospectively, the Framers limited the legis-
latures to the use of penal legislation as a so-called specific, or special, deterrent. See
Warren v. United States Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cer. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982); Ex Post Facto Limitations, supra note 16, at 1498-1500. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court observed:
The reason why [ex post facto] laws are so universally condemned is, that they
overlook the great object of all criminal law, which is, to hold up the fear and
certainty of punishment as a counteracting motive, to the minds of persons
tempted to crime, to prevent them from committing it. But a punishment pre-
scribed after an act is done, cannot, of course, present any such motive. It is
contrary to the fundamental principle of criminal justice, which is, that the per-
son who violates a law deserves punishment, because he wilfully breaks a law,
which, in theory, he knows or may know to exist. But he cannot know of the
existence of a law which does not, in fact, exist at the time, but is enacted
afterwards.
Jacquins v. Commonwealth, 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 279, 281 (1852). Retroactive legislation
might well serve the other purposes of the penal law: retribution, rehabilitation, incapaci-
tation, and general deterrence. See Warren v. United States Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d
183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982); Ex Post Facto Limitations,
supra note 16, at 1498-1500. In Warren, the Court stated:
The constitutional ban on ex post facto laws.., suggests that the framers con-
sidered the possibility of special deterrence a prerequisite to the imposition of
specifically criminal penalties. The framers' position may have been based on
the idea that, because special deterrence is so central to the criminal law, enact-
ment of a criminal statute that cannot serve this function raises a strong pre-
sumption that the legislature's motives are impermissible. Since judicial inquiry
into the motives of the legislature is difficult and unseemly, the framers may
have considered it the better course to ban such legislation from the start.
Iad at 188-89.
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There are two kinds of retroactive laws that the ex post facto clauses
clearly prohibit: those that change the elements of a crime or create a
new one,38 and those that increase the amount of punishment meted out
for an existing violation.39 Retroactive changes to rules of criminal pro-
cedure generally fall outside these two categories.40 Although the
Supreme Court has stressed that a defendant does not have a right to be
tried in all respects by the procedures in effect at the time she committed
her crime,4 the Court often has acknowledged that a procedural or evi-
dentiary change can rise to the level of an ex post facto violation.42
38. See Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, (1925); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S.
565, 589 (1896); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325-26, 329 (1867); Calder
v. Bull, 3 U.S. 305, 309, 3 Dall. 386, 390-91 (1798).
39. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282,
292 (1977); Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S.
167, 169-70 (1925); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 589-90 (1896). The Court is
much less strict about changes in the nature of punishment. It upheld a change in the
method of administering capital punishment from hanging to electrocution, finding that
this did not increase the punishment, and that for all the Court could tell might actually
mitigate it. See Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 183 (1915); see also Rooney v.
North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 324-26 (1905) (retroactive change in the circumstances of
confinement in the period before prisoner was to be executed held not to violate the cx
post facto prohibition). The Court's ex post facto analysis does not look at the impact of
a change on a particular defendant, but at the overall effect of the challenged law on all
defendants. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 33 (1981) ("[Ex post facto] inquiry
looks to challenged provision, and not to ... its effect on the particular individual.");
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294 (1977) (Court looks at the new procedure in toto,
rather than to any effect that it may have had on the defendant challenging it). Thus,
retroactive application of a law making the former maximum sentence mandatory was
found invalid despite that it may have caused no increase in the punishment given to the
particular defendant who challenged it. See Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401-02
(1937).
40. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 n.12 (1981); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S.
282, 293-94 (1977); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884); see also Ex Post Facto Limi-
tations, supra note 16, at 1492-94 (discussing uncertainty of application of the ex post
facto prohibition to legislative changes that neither increase punishment or change the
elements of a crime). For discussion of the application of the ex post facto prohibition to
changes in procedural law, see Ex Post Facto Limitations, supra note 16; Note, Changes in
Procedural Law as Ex Post Facto Legislation, 74 U. Pa. L. Rev. 400 (1925) [hereinafter
Changes in Procedural Law].
41. In Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896), the Court wrote:
The inhibition upon the passage of ex post facto laws does not give a criminal a
right to be tried, in all respects, by the law in force when the crime charged was
committed. The mode of trial is always under legislative control, subject only
to the condition that the legislature may not, under the guise of establishing
modes of procedure and prescribing remedies, violate the accepted principles
that protect an accused person against ex post facto enactments.
Id. at 590; see also Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884) (legislation in question "re-
late[d] to modes of procedure only, in which no one can be said to have a vested right,
and which the State, upon grounds of public policy, may regulate at pleasure").
42. See Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 (1925); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S.
380, 388 (1898); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 228, 232 (1883); Cummings v. Mis-
souri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 326 (1867); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 305, 309, 3 Dall. 386, 390-
91 (1798).
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Nonetheless, the Court rarely has held such changes to be invalid43 and
has offered limited guidance as to what type of procedural change may
run afoul of the constitutional prohibition.'
In 1883 the Supreme Court introduced the substantial rights test for ex
post facto challenges to changes in criminal procedure.45 Under this test,
a procedural change cannot be applied retroactively if it infringes on a
substantial right that the defendant enjoyed at the time she commited her
crime. This has left lower courts without guidance on whether to em-
phasize the amount of detriment caused to the defendant or the nature of
43. Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883), and Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343
(1898), appear to be the only two cases in which the Court has invalidated procedural
changes on ex post facto grounds. See Ex Post Facto Limitations, supra note 16 at 1507-
11; infra notes 50-55.
44. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (discussing the ambiguity of the
"substantial rights" test); see also Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 (1925) ("Just what
alterations of procedure will be held to be of sufficient moment to transgress the constitu-
tional prohibition cannot be embraced within a formula or stated in a general
proposition.").
45. See Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 232 (1883) (5-4 decision). Kring pleaded
guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment.
He appealed on the ground that his plea agreement with the prosecutor had called for a
sentence not to exceed ten years. The state supreme court reversed the conviction and
remanded the case. At the time of Kring's alleged crime, his plea and subsequent convic-
tion of second-degree murder would have functioned as an absolute bar to prosecution for
first-degree murder in his trial on remand. By the time of Kring's retrial, this law had
been changed. On remand, he was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to
death. This was affirmed by the state supreme court. See id at 221-22. The Supreme
Court, split five to four, held that this did violate the ex post facto prohibition. See id. at
235-36.
Although the Kring majority was certain that the new law was ex post facto, it had
difficulty expressing exactly why. At first, the majority tried to fit the Kring facts into the
Calder categories of ex post facto laws. See id. at 227-28. It suggested that the legislative
change effectively increased the punishment for the crime, and that it changed the rules of
evidence, in the sense that the previous conviction of second-degree murder had been
"conclusive evidence of innocence of the higher grade of murder." Id. at 228. The latter
assertion was not quite true, since under the prior statute a subsequent prosecution for
first-degree murder simply had been barred. Perhaps sensing that these arguments were
weak, the majority stated that the Calder categories were not meant to be exclusive and
sought other grounds for its decision. See id. The Court found that the legislative change
had deprived Kring of a defense to which the law at the time he committed his crime had
entitled him, and suggested that any retroactive legislation, procedural or otherwise,
would violate the ex post facto prohibition if it altered the situation of the defendant to
his disadvantage. See icL at 228-29 (citing United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 84, 86
(C.C.D. Pa. 1809) (No. 15,285)).
Kring seemed to stand for the proposition that any retroactive change in procedural
law that operated to the detriment of a defendant would violate the ex post facto clause.
Although there must be detriment in order for there to be an ex post facto violation, see
supra note 15 and accompanying text, to hold that any retroactively applied detrimental
change was an ex post facto violation would have given a very liberal construction to the
constitutional prohibition. The Court unanimously rejected such a construction in Hopt
v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884), decided just one year later. Kring became something of
an anomaly, coming to stand for the proposition that any retroactive procedural change
that deprives the defendant of a defense will violate the ex post facto prohibition. See
Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1898); Ex Post Facto Limitations, supra
note 16, at 1507-09.
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the right thwarted."
Although an early Supreme Court dictum had suggested that retroac-
tively applied evidentiary changes not only could, but might necessarily
be ex post facto, 47 the Court has never invalidated a simple evidentiary
change under this constitutional provision.4" In two cases, Hopt v.
Utah49 and Thompson v. Missouri," the Court held that such changes
did not infringe upon any substantial rights of a defendant. In Hopt, the
Court held that the retroactive application of the repeal of a law render-
ing convicted felons incompetent to testify in court did not violate the ex
post facto prohibition,51 although the change allowed the defendant to be
46. In Kring, the Court said that "any law passed after the commission of an offence
which... 'in relation to that offence, or its consequences, alters the situation of a party to
his disadvantage,' is an ex post facto law," 107 U.S. at 235 (quoting United States v. Hall,
26 F. Cas. 84, 86 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809) (No. 15,285)), which suggested that any retroactive
procedural change that disadvantaged a defendant would thereby infringe on a "substan-
tial right." See id. A year later, however, the Court declined to invalidate a retroactive
procedural change that clearly caused great detriment to the defendant who challenged it.
See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589-90 (1884) (retroactive application of the repeal of a
law which had imposed an absolute testimonial incompetency on convicted felons). In
Hopt, the Court offered no explanation for its holding that the legislative change did not
deprive the defendant of a "substantial right." In Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565,
589 (1896), and Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382 (1894), the Court again stated
perfunctorily that the challenged procedural changes did not infringe on any "substantial
rights." Then in Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898), the Court identified substantial
rights as those that were regarded as important at the time of the adoption of the Consti-
tution. See id. at 352. This might have provided a workable standard but was not fol-
lowed. See, e.g., Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 593-97 (1901) (surveying the
Supreme Court's ex post facto case law without any mention of Thompson v. Utah).
47. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 305, 309, 3 Dal]. 386, 390-91 (1798).
48. In Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883), and Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 277 (1867), among the grounds for the Supreme Court's invalidation of retroactive
laws was that they altered the rules of evidence. See Kring, 107 U.S. at 228; Cummings,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 328. The evidentiary changes in these cases, however, were collateral
to the main effect of the legislation challenged. In Kring, the Court argued that the re-
moval of a bar to reprosecution for first-degree murder was an evidentiary change. See
supra note 45. In Cummings, the Court found that a law that penalized those who could
not swear an oath that they had not participated in the Confederate war effort introduced
a new rule of evidence to prove the crime it created. See Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at
327-29. In both cases, the reference to evidentiary changes can be seen as an attempt to
fit unique legislation into the categories enumerated in Calder. See Kring, 107 U.S. at
227-28; Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 325-26. Both were decided before Hopt v. Utah,
110 U.S. 574 (1884), which discredited the Calder dictum that retroactive evidentiary
changes would violate the ex post facto clause. See infra note 134; see also Beazell v.
Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 (1925) ("statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of
evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a
limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage," are not ex post facto).
49. 110 U.S. 574 (1884) (repeal of statute that had made convicted felons incompetent
to testify in court).
50. 171 U.S. 380 (1898) (retroactive change in the evidence that was admissible to
prove handwriting not ex post facto); see also Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595 (1977)
(upholding statutory change that allowed jury to infer elements of obscenity violation
from evidence of circumstances that had not been admissible previously, but not deciding
ex post facto question).
51. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589-90 (1884).
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convicted of murder and sentenced to death.52 According to the Court, a
change that merely enlarged the class of persons competent to testify
would not be found ex post facto,53 but an evidentiary change might run
afoul of the ex post facto clauses if it changed the "quantity or the degree
of proof necessary to establish [the defendant's] guilt." In Thompson,
the Court upheld a retroactively applied change that admitted previously
inadmissable evidence to demonstrate the genuineness of disputed
writings. 5
5
The Supreme Court recently clarified its approach to the ex post facto
limitations on procedural changes. In Dobbert v. Florida,56 the Court
simply stated that changes to the rules of criminal procedure cannot be
ex post facto laws within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition.5
Although this holding is consistent with the Court's past decisions,
which rarely had found such changes to be ex post facto,5" Dobbert repre-
sents a distinct change in tone from prior dicta suggesting that proce-
dural changes might violate the ex post facto clauses." The Dobbert
opinion, however, did not create a standard for distinguishing procedural
from substantive changes. Lower courts have taken up this question, rec-
ognizing that the mere denomination of a change as "procedural" is not
dispositive. ° A seemingly procedural change may be substantive in na-
ture or have substantive consequences.61
II. ACCOMPLICE CORROBORATION REQUIREMENTS
At common law, there was no formal barrier to the conviction of a
52. See id at 575.
53. See id at 589.
54. Id
55. See Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 381 (1898).
56. 432 U.S. 282 (1977).
57. See id at 292-94; accord Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 n.12 (1981).
58. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. At first glance, the Court's blunt state-
ment that procedural changes do not violate the ex post facto prohibition, see 432 U.S. at
292 ("We conclude that the [challenged] changes in the law are procedural, and on the
whole ameliorative, and that there is no ex posto [sic] facto violation." (footnote omit-
ted)); id at 292 n.6 ("These are independent bases for our decision. For example, in
Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167 (1925), we found a procedural change not ex post facto
even though the change was by no means ameliorative."), would seem to overrule Kring
v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883), and Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898), which had
held that procedural changes can violate the constitutional prohibition. In Weaver v.
Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981), the Court attempted to reconcile these two approaches by
stating that while a change that is "merely" procedural will not violate the ex post facto
clauses, a procedural change that alters a substantial right is not "merely" procedural.
Id at 29 n.12.
60. See United States v. Molt, 758 F.2d 1198, 1201 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 1458 (1986).
61. See Raimondo v. Belletire, 789 F.2d 492, 494 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v.
McCahill, 765 F.2d 849, 850 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Molt, 758 F.2d 1198, 1201
(7th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct 1458 (1986).
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defendant based solely on the testimony of an accomplice.62 This type of
testimony, however, has always been viewed with suspicion 63 because it
is thought that accomplices will try to implicate their codefendants in
order to exculpate themselves.6' In the days when the role of a state
court judge included advising the jury as to the quality and sufficiency of
the evidence,65 judges would warn the jury to examine an accomplice's
testimony carefully, giving special attention to whether there was other
evidence tending to corroborate the accomplice's assertions." With the
decline of this role,6 s many United States jurisdictions instituted a formal
rule requiring corroboration of an accomplice's testimony to sustain a
conviction. 6' Eventually, almost half of United States jurisdictions en-
acted statutes requiring such corroboration.69 The most common form
of these statutes mandates that a defendant cannot be convicted on the
testimony of an accomplice unless it is corroborated by other evidence
tending to connect the defendant to the commission of the crime
62. See Murphy v. Sowders, 801 F.2d 205, 208 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1593 (1987); Cunningham v. State, 54 Ala. App. 656, 658, 312 So. 2d 62, 63-64 (Crim.
App. 1975); Alldredge v. State, 45 Ala. App. 171, 173, 227 So. 2d 803, 805 (Crim. App.
1969); People v. Dixon, 231 N.Y. 111, 116, 131 N.E. 752, 753-54 (1921); In re Jones, 43
Misc. 2d 390, 395, 251 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1964); State v. Douglas, 70
S.D. 203, 224, 16 N.W.2d 489, 499 (1944); Thompson v. State, 691 S.W.2d 627, 631,
(Tex. Crim. App. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 184 (1985); 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence,
§ 2056, at 405 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1978); Wigmore, Required Numbers of Witnesses; A
Brief History of the Numerical System in England, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 83, 99 (1901).
63. See New York Guar. and Indem. Co. v. Gleason, 78 N.Y. 503, 512 (1879); In re
Jones, 43 Misc. 2d 390, 395, 251 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1964); 7 J. Wigmore,
supra note 62, § 2056.
64. See Oxenberg v. State, 362 P.2d 893, 896, (Alaska 1961); People v. Belton, 23 Cal.
3d 516, 525, 591 P.2d 485, 491, 153 Cal. Rptr. 195, 202 (1979); State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho
96, 101, 685 P.2d 837, 842 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Johnson, 237 N.W.2d 819, 822 (Iowa
1976); Glaze v. State, 565 P.2d 710, 712 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); Eckert v. State, 623
S.W.2d 359, 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); 3 B. Jones, Evidence, § 20:60, at 736 (S. Gard
rev. 6th ed. 1972); 7 J. Wigmore, supra note 62, § 2057, at 417.
65. See 7 J. Wigmore, supra note 62, § 2056, at 416; infra note 67.
66. See People v. Dixon, 231 N.Y. 111, 116, 131 N.E. 752, 753 (1921); Maine v.
People, 9 Hun. 113, 120 (N.Y. 1876); 3 B. Jones, supra note 64, § 20:60, at 736-37; 7 J.
Wigmore, supra note 62, § 2056, at 416.
67. Wigmore attributed the spread of these rules to the decline in the informal role of
the judge as an advisor to the jury. Once judges were no longer allowed to comment on
the evidence, 7 J. Wigmore, supra note 62, § 2056, at 416, it was felt that there should be
a formal rule protecting defendants from conviction by juries who might not realize that
the credibility of accomplices was suspect. See id. § 2056, at 416-17.
68. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1111 (West 1985); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 634.04 (West
1983); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.22 (McKinney 1981). For general discussion of ac-
complice corroboration requirements, see Annotation, Question as to Who are Accom-
plices Within the Rule Requiring Corroboration of Their Testimony, as One of Law or
Fact, 19 A.L.R.2d 1352 (1951).
69. In 1975, 24 United States jurisdictions had accomplice corroboration require-
ments. See 7 J. Wigmore, supra note 62, § 2056, at 414 n. 10 (listing 23); see also Mont.
Code Ann. § 46-16-213 (1985) (also in effect in 1975). The majority of these were passed
between 1850 and 1900. See infra note 70 for dates of enactment of the extant accomplice
corroboration statutes.
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charged.7°
An accomplice is generally defined as a person who is or could have
been indicted for the same crime, arising out of the same events, as the
defendant. 7 ' The status of a witness as an accomplice generally is a ques-
tion of fact, but may be decided as a matter of law if it is undisputed or
70. The Alaska Accomplice Corroboration Statute, Alaska Stat. § 12.45.020 (1984)
(originally enacted 1962), is representative of the texts of these statutes:
A conviction shall not be had on the testimony of an accomplice unless it is
corroborated by other evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the
commission of the crime; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely
shows the commission of the crime or the circumstances of the commission.
See also Ala. Code § 12-21-222 (1986) (originally enacted 1852); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-
2116 (1977) (originally enacted 1883) (limited to use in trials for felonies); Cal. Penal
Code § 1111 (West 1985) (originally enacted 1851) (expressly defines accomplice as "one
who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on
trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given"); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 24-4-8 (1982) (originally enacted 1863); Idaho Code § 19-2117 (1979) (originally en-
acted 1864) (includes an explicit provision that the corroborative evidence must "in itself,
and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice, ten[d] to connect the defendant
with the commission of the offense"); Iowa Code Ann. § 813.2 (R. 20 (3)) (West 1979 &
Supp. 1986) (originally enacted 1866) (also applies to "solicited person[s]"); Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 634.04 (1983) (originally enacted 1858); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-16-213 (1985)
(originally enacted 1947) (prohibits conviction based on the uncorroborated testimony of
"one responsible or legally accountable for the same offense"); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 175.291
(1985) (includes provision that corroborating evidence must "in itself, and without the
aid of the testimony of the accomplice, ten[d] to connect the defendant with the commis-
sion of the offense;" also explicitly defines accomplice as "one who is liable to prosecu-
tion, for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which
the testimony of the accomplice is given"); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.22 (McKimnney
1981) (originally enacted 1881) (includes the following provisions:
2. An "accomplice" means a witness in a criminal action who, according to
evidence adduced in such action, may reasonably be considered to have partici-
pated in:
(a) The offense charged; or
(b) An offense based upon the same or some of the same facts or conduct
which constitute the offense charged.
3. A witness who is an accomplice as defined in subdivision two is no less such
because a prosecution or conviction of himself would be barred or precluded by
some defense or exemption, such as infancy, immunity or previous prosecution,
amounting to a collateral impediment to such prosecution or conviction, not
affecting the conclusion that such witness engaged in the conduct constituting
the offense with the mental state required for the commission thereof.);
N.D. Cent. Code § 29-21-14 (1974) (originally enacted 1877); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22,
§ 742 (West 1969) (originally enacted 1887); Or. Rev. Stat. § 136.440 (1984) (includes
definition of accomplice as one who is criminally liable, under the state statutes governing
vicarious liability, for the conduct of the defendant; juvenile witnesses are to be consid-
ered accomplices if their conduct would have rendered them such under the law applying
to adults); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 34, App. II, R. 156 (Supp. 1986) (originally enacted 1935)
(1974 amendment changed "accomplice" to "coauthor"); S.D. Codified Laws Ann.
§ 23A-22-8 (1979) (originally enacted 1877); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 38.14
(Vernon 1979) (originally enacted 1925).
71. See Leonard v. State, 43 Ala. App. 454, 463, 192 So. 2d 461, 469 (1966); McClure
v. State, 214 Ark. 159, 167, 215 S.W.2d 524, 529 (1948); State v. Wiese, 182 N.W.2d 918,
920 (Iowa 1971); State v. Jones, 347 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. 1984); People v. Beaudet,
32 N.Y.2d 371, 374-75, 298 N.E.2d 647, 649, 345 N.Y.S.2d 495, 498 (1973); People v.
Mills, 96 P.R.R. 623, 625-26 (1968); Carrillo v. State, 591 S.W.2d 876, 882 (Tex. Crim.
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indisputable.72 Corroborative evidence generally is defined as evidence
that, viewed independently from the testimony of the accomplice, would
tend to connect the defendant to the commission of the crime charged.73
It need not support the particular facts attested to, but should enhance
the credibility of the accomplice's assertions by connecting the defendant
to the criminal act.74 The testimony of an accomplice can not be corrob-
orated by that of another accomplice,75 or by any real evidence that relies
on an accomplice for authentication.76
Accomplice testimony is technically both competent and admissible,
but where it is the sole testimony offered against the accused, the submis-
sion of the prosecution's case to the jury is conditioned on the introduc-
tion of potentially corroborative evidence.77 The existence in the record
of evidence that may corroborate the accomplice's testimony is a thresh-
App. 1979); see also N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.22 (McKinney 1981) (explicitly incorpo-
rating this provision).
72. See Leonard v. State, 43 Ala. App. 454, 464, 192 So. 2d 461, 470-71 (1966); Du-
Bois v. State, 258 Ark. 459, 468-70, 527 S.W.2d 595, 600-01 (1975); People v. Ahem, 113
Cal. App. 2d 746, 749, 249 P.2d 63, 70 (1952); People v. Hoover, 12 Cal. 3d 875, 882, 528
P.2d 760, 763, 117 Cal. Rptr. 672, 675 (1974); People v. Beaudet, 32 N.Y.2d 371, 376,
298 N.E.2d 647, 650, 345 N.Y.S.2d 495, 499-500 (1973); State v. Thorson, 264 N.W.2d
441, 442 (N.D. 1978); Carrillo v. State, 591 S.W.2d 876, 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
73. See Christy v. United States, 261 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 919 (1959); Cunningham v. State, 54 Ala. App. 656, 658, 312 So. 2d 62, 63-64
(Crim. App. 1975); State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 100, 685 P.2d 837, 841 (1984); Thomp-
son v. State, 691 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Eckert v. State, 623 S.W.2d
359, 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); 3 B. Jones, supra note 64, § 20:60, at 738. But see
Oxenberg v. State, 362 P.2d 893, 896-97 (Alaska 1961) (finding it impractical and unnec-
essary to attempt to view allegedly corroborative evidence separately from the testimony
of the accomplice).
74. See Christy v. United States, 261 F.2d 357, 359-60 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 919 (1959); Dimmick v. State, 473 P.2d 616, 617 (Alaska 1970); Oxenberg v.
State, 362 P.2d 893, 896-97 (Alaska 1961); State v. Edwards, 136 Ariz. 177, 185, 665 P.2d
59, 67 (1983); State v. Vesey, 241 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Iowa 1976); Eckert v. State, 623
S.W.2d 359, 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); 3 B. Jones, supra note 64, § 20:60, at 738; 7 J.
Wigmore, supra note 62, § 2059, at 423.
Such evidence need not be sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict by itself, see Cunning-
ham v. State, 54 Ala. App. 656, 658, 312 So. 2d 62, 63-64 (Crim. App. 1975); State v.
Thorson, 264 N.W.2d 441, 446 (N.D. 1978); Thompson v. State, 691 S.W.2d 627, 631
(Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Eckert v. State, 623 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981),
and may be merely circumstantial. See Christy v. United States, 261 F.2d 357, 359 (9th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 919 (1959); State v. Edwards, 136 Ariz. 177, 185, 665
P.2d 59, 67 (1983); People v. Henderson, 34 Cal. 2d 340, 343, 209 P.2d 785, 786 (1949);
State v. Rosser, 162 Or. 293, 341-42, 91 P.2d 295, 299 (1939); Eckert v. State, 623 S.W.2d
359, 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
75. See People v. Marshall, 273 Cal. App. 2d 423, 426, 78 Cal. Rptr. 16, 18 (1969);
People v. Malone, 205 A.D. 257, 262, 199 N.Y.S. 646, 649 (1923); Rutledge v. State, 507
P.2d 551, 552 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); Brown v. State, 167 Tex. Crim. 352, 355, 320
S.W.2d 845, 847 (1959); 7 J. Wigmore, supra note 62, § 2059, at 421.
76. See Ing v. United States, 278 F.2d 362, 366-67 (9th Cir. 1960); People v. Bowley,
59 Cal. 2d 855, 861-62, 382 P.2d 591, 595-96, 31 Cal. Rptr. 471, 475-76 (1963); People v.
Siegel, 282 A.D. 747, 748, 122 N.Y.S.2d 638, 639 (1953); Annotation, Corroboration of
Accomplice Witness by Objective Evidence Authenticated by Same Accomplice, 96
A.L.R.2d 1185 (1964).
77. See Leonard v. State, 43 Ala. App. 454, 464-65, 192 So. 2d 461, 470-71 (1966);
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old question decided by the judge, who will not submit the issue of guilt
to the trier of fact unless it is present.78 Once potentially corroborative
evidence is determined to have been introduced, the question of the
weight given to such evidence in regard to the ultimate issue of the guilt
of the accused is solely for the trier of fact to decide. 9 The jury is in-
structed that it must first find whether the witness in question was an
accomplice. If it finds that she was, the jury is told that it may not con-
vict the defendant unless it finds that the accomplice's testimony was
corroborated by other evidence in the record.8
Accomplice corroboration requirements have recently fallen into disfa-
vor. In the last decade, a quarter of the jurisdictions that had statutes
requiring the corroboration of an accomplice's testimony repealed
them.81 This reflects a modem trend towards removing evidentiary disa-
bilities and permitting the jury to weigh all of the available evidence.8 2
Upon the repeal of these statutes, the question arose whether a defendant
State v. Johnson, 237 N.W.2d 819, 822 (Iowa 1976); 7 J. Wigmore, supra note 62, § 2059,
at 421-22 & n.3.
78. See Christy v. United States, 261 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir. 1958), cerL denied, 360
U.S. 919 (1959); Leonard v. State, 43 Ala. App. 454, 464-65, 192 So. 2d 461, 470-71
(1966); Oxenberg v. State, 362 P.2d 893, 897 (Alaska 1961); State v. Vesey, 241 N.W.2d
888, 890-91 (Iowa 1976); State v. Thorson, 264 N.W.2d 441, 445 (N.D. 1978); 7 J. Wig-
more, supra note 62, § 2059, at 438.
79. See Christy v. United States, 261 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 919 (1959); Cunningham v. State, 54 Ala. App. 656, 658-59, 312 So. 2d 62, 64
(Crim. App. 1975); Oxenberg v. State, 362 P.2d 893, 897 (Alaska 1961).
80. See Christy v. United States, 261 F.2d 357, 359 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 919 (1959); Cunningham v. State, 54 Ala. App. 656, 658-59, 312 So. 2d 62, 63-64
(Crim. App. 1975); Leonard v. State, 43 Ala. App. 454, 464-65, 192 So. 2d 461, 471
(1966); Oxenberg v. State, 362 P.2d 893, 897 (Alaska 1961).
81. Between 1973 and 1980, six United States jurisdictions withdrew their accomplice
corroboration requirements. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-136 (repealed 1976); Ky. R.
Crim. Proc. 9.62 (abolished 1980); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 579:4 (repealed 1973); Utah
Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (superceded 1979); V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14 § 17 (repealed 1978);
Wyo. Stat. § 7-6-262 (repealed 1975).
82. In Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918), the Supreme Court wrote:
[It is] the disposition of courts and of legislative bodies to remove disabilities
from witnesses... under dominance of the conviction of our time that the truth
is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all persons of compe-
tent understanding who may seem to have knowledge of the facts involved in a
case, leaving the credit and weight of such testimony to be determined by the
jury or by the court, rather than by rejecting witnesses as incompetent, with the
result that this principle has come to be widely, almost universally, accepted in
this country and in Great Britain.
l at 471; see also Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 20-22 (1967) (discussing the trend
away from the disqualification of witnesses for their supposed inclination to perjure them-
selves); McCormick on Evidence § 65, at 159-61 (E. Cleary, ed. 3d ed. 1984) (describing
the demise of the testimonial disqualification of interested parties); 3 J. Weinstein, Evi-
dence, t 601[05] at 601-37 ("[Ihe modem trend ... has converted questions of compe-
tency into questions of credibility while 'steadily moving towards a realization that
judicial determination of the question of whether a witness should be heard at all should
be abrogated in favor of hearing the testimony for what it is worth.' "(quoting Comment,
Witnesses Under Article IV of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 Wayne L Rev.
1236, 1250 (1969))).
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whose alleged crime was committed before the date of repeal could be
convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Courts
that have addressed whether retroactive application of the repeal of the
accomplice corroboration requirement would be an ex post facto law
within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition have reached incon-
sistent results.8 3
III. Ex POST FACTO LIMITATIONS ON THE REPEAL OF ACCOMPLICE
CORROBORATION REQUIREMENTS
A. The Lower Courts
Two federal courts of appeals have heard cases in which the retroac-
tive application of the repeal of an accomplice corroboration requirement
was challenged on ex post facto grounds. These courts reached conflict-
ing results, although they both relied principally on the same precedent.
In Government of the Virgin Islands v. Civil, 4 the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit found that conviction on the basis of uncorroborated
accomplice testimony for a crime that was committed before the repeal
of the accomplice corroboration requirement violates the ex post facto
clause.8 5 The court based its holding on a Supreme Court dictum86 that
is often cited, but rarely followed. 7 This dictum, from the Hopt deci-
sion, states that a retroactive law may violate the ex post facto prohibi-
83. Compare Government of the Virgin Islands v. Civil, 591 F.2d 255, 259 (3d Cir.
1979) (holding that the retroactive application of the repeal of an accomplice corrobora-
tion requirement violates the ex post facto prohibition) and State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d
1215, 1218 (Utah 1986) (same) with Murphy v. Sowders, 801 F.2d 205, 209 (6th Cir.
1986) (holding that the retroactive application of the repeal of an accomplice corrobora-
tion requirement does not violate the ex post facto prohibition), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1593 (1987) and Murphy v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 69, 72-73 (Ky. 1983) (same).
84. 591 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1979).
85. See id. at 259.
86. See id. at 259 (citing Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589-90 (1884)).
87. See, e.g., Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1122, 1127 n.6 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); United States v. Henson, 486 F.2d 1292, 1306 n.15 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (en banc); Landay v. United States, 108 F.2d 698, 705 (6th Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 309 U.S. 681 (1940); Exparte Alabama, 433 So. 2d 469, 472 (Ala. 1983); State v.
Steelman, 120 Ariz. 301, 318, 585 P.2d 1213, 1230 (1978), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 913
(1980); People v. Bradford, 70 Cal. 2d 333, 343 n.5, 450 P.2d 46, 51 n.5, 74 Cal. Rptr.
726, 731 n.5 (Cal. 1969); State v. Moyer, 387 A.2d 194, 197 (Del. 1978); State ex rel.
Dorton v. Circuit Ct., 274 Ind. 373, 376, 412 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ind. 1980); Warner v. State,
265 Ind. 262, 271, 354 N.E.2d 178, 184 (1976); State v. Jones, 67 Ohio St. 2d 244, 248,
423 N.E.2d 447, 449 (1981); State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 587 (Utah 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 942 (1984); State v. Edwards, 104 Wash. 2d 63, 71, 701 P.2d 508, 512-13 (1985);
State v. Pope, 73 Wash. 2d 919, 924-25, 442 P.2d 994, 997-98 (1968); State v. Clevenger,
69 Wash. 2d 136, 141-42, 417 P.2d 626, 630 (1966). But see DeWoody v. Superior Ct., 8
Cal. App. 3d 52, 56-57, 87 Cal. Rptr. 210, 212 (1970) (new statute that created presump-
tion of intoxication based on a certain level of blood alcohol was found to violate the ex
post facto clauses because it permitted conviction on "less proof, in amount or degree");
State v. Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 166, 627 P.2d 788, 795-96 (1981) (holding that the overul-
ing of a requirement of corroboration of rape victims' testimony cannot be retroactively
applied).
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tion if it "alter[s] the degree, or lessen[s] the amount or measure, of the
proof which was made necessary to conviction when the crime was com-
mitted.""8 The Civil court read this as referring to alterations in the
quantity of evidence required for a guilty verdict.8 9 Therefore, to allow a
conviction on the testimony of one witness, where the law previously had
required corroborating evidence in addition to the testimony of one wit-
ness, seemed to reduce the "amount of proof" needed to convict. 0
In Murphy v. Sowders,91 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
faced the same issue and held that retroactive application of the repealed
statute did not violate the ex post facto clause. 92 Although the majority
in Murphy agreed that Hopt v. Utah was the relevant precedent,93 it
found the facts of the Hopt case more apposite than its dictum.94
The Hopt case concerned the repeal of a statute that made convicted
felons incompetent to testify in a court of law.95 The Supreme Court
held that the retroactive application of this repeal did not violate the ex
post facto prohibition96 and upheld Hopt's conviction and sentence of
death.97 To the Murphy majority, the repeal of an accomplice corrobora-
tion requirement was analogous to the repeal of a law imposing an abso-
lute testimonial disability on felons: both "simply enlarged the class of
persons to be considered competent to testify."98 The Murphy majority
viewed the reference in the Hopt dictum to alterations in the "amount or
degree of proof" as referring solely to the standard of proof in a criminal
trial-that guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 99
The dissent in the Murphy case opined that the majority was making
an unconvincing attempt to get around the plain meaning of the Hopt
dictum."°° The dissenting opinion agreed with the Civil court that the
statutory change obviously altered the amount of proof necessary to con-
88. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589 (1884).
89. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Civil, 591 F.2d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 1979).
90. See id
91. 801 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1593 (1987).
92. See id at 211.
93. See id. at 206.
94. See id at 206-07.
95. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 587-89 (1884).
96. See id at 589-90.
97. See id at 575, 590.
98. Murphy v. Sowders, 801 F.2d 205, 208 (6th Cir. 1986). The Murphy majority
noted that in both cases the repeal removed an impediment to the testimony of a certain
type of witness whose testimony had been deemed incredible as a matter of law. See id.
99. See id. at 209-10. The Murphy majority based its holding on a detailed textual
analysis of the Hopt opinion, finding that Justice Harlan meant to contrast changes in the
elements of a crime, and the burden of proving those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, with mere alterations in trial procedure. "'[Procedural] regulations of the mode
in which thefacts constituting guilt may be placed before the jury can be made applicable
... without reference to the date of the commission of the offense charged.'" I. at 209
(quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884) (emphasis in Murphy)).
100. See id. at 215 (Brown, J., dissenting). The Murphy dissent urged a distinction
between the law repealed in Hopi, which had deemed felons absolutely incompetent to
testify, i.e., incredible as a matter of law, and the repeal of an accomplice corroboration
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vict. 01 More significantly, it pointed out that any law altering the stan-
dard of proof would be invalid on due process grounds without need to
refer to the ex post facto prohibition. 02 Under this view, the Hopt dic-
tum would make little sense as referring to the standard of proof and
therefore must refer to quantitative rules of evidence.
B. The Dobbert Standard
In Dobbert v. Florida,03 the Supreme Court made it clear that changes
in procedural law are immune to attack on ex post facto grounds unless
they can be shown to effect a substantive change."o Neither the Supreme
Court nor any lower court has enunciated a clear standard for deciding
when a seemingly procedural change will be considered substantive for
ex post facto purposes.10 5 The case law suggests, however, that in order
requirement, under which accomplices had been competent to testify, but whose credibil-
ity was conditioned upon the introduction of corroborative evidence. Id.
101. See id. at 215.
102. See id. at 216.
103. 432 U.S. 282 (1977).
104. See Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 292-97; see also United States v. McCahill, 765 F.2d 849,
850 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Even if a retroactive change in the law is a disadvantage to the
criminal defendant, it does not violate the ex post facto clause if the change is procedural
rather than substantive."); United States v. Molt, 758 F.2d 1198, 1201 (7th Cir.) (to
violate the the ex post facto prohibition, a procedural change must "alter a substantial
right"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1458 (1985); supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text
(discussing the Dobbert holding in the context of the Court's overall ex post facto
jurisprudence).
105. In an early case in which the Supreme Court held that a retroactive procedural
change could violate the ex post facto prohibition, the Court noted that rules of evidence
generally are considered to be in the realm of procedural law. See Kring v. Missouri, 107
U.S. 221, 231-32 (1883) (quoting Bishop on Criminal Procedure). However, the question
of what will be considered substantive and what procedural "implies different variables
depending upon the particular problem for which it is used." Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945). Substance versus procedure for the purpose of ex post
facto analysis is recognized as a particular area of inquiry. See id. The Supreme Court
has not offered any theoretical distinction between matters of procedure and substance
under the ex post facto clauses, but has suggested parameters through an "accretion of
case law." Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292 (1977). In the several cases in which
the Court faced ex post facto challenges to evidentiary rules, it has found them to be
procedural, see supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text, even though one of them con-
cerned the competency of witnesses, see Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884) (convicted
felons), a matter that would be considered substantive under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. See Fed. R. Evid. 601; Note, Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures Evi-
dence in Diversity Actions Based on Strict Products Liability, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 1485,
1491-93 (1985) (discussing the distinctions between substance and procedure incorpo-
rated into the Federal Rules of Evidence). Statutes of limitations are substantive for Erie
purposes, see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945), but for ex post facto
purposes their nature varies. The extension of an unexpired statute of limitations does
not violate the ex post facto prohibition, but once the time period expires, it may not be
revived retroactively. See Black, Statutes of Limitation and the Ex Post Facto Clauses, 26
Ky. L.J. 41, 49 (1937). Compare Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945)
(statutes of limitations substantive for Erie purposes) with Clements v. United States, 266
F.2d 397, 399 (9th Cir.) (extension of unexpired statute of limitations does not violate the
ex post facto prohibition), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 985 (1959) and State v. Sneed, 25 (Supp.)
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for a procedural change to violate the ex post facto clauses, it must effec-
tively alter the substantive elements of a crime 0 6 or cause an increase in
the punishment meted out for an existing violation." 7 In other words, a
Tex. 66, 67 (1860) (revival of an expired statute of limitations violates the ex post facto
prohibition).
106. In Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595 (1977), the Court upheld a statutory change
that allowed the jury to infer the elements of an obscenity violation from evidence of
circumstances that previously had not been admissible. Although the Court did not
reach the ex post facto question, id at 601, it seemed to imply that an evidentiary change
of this type could allow such different evidence to form the basis of proof, or could create
a permissable inference from such different circumstances, as effectively to deny a defend-
ant of notice of what activity would be regarded as culpable. Id. at 600. In other words,
an evidentiary change could effectively change the substantive elements of a crime. Other
commentators agree with this interpretation of Splawn. See I J. Wigrnore, Evidence § 7,
at 469 n.4 (P. Tillers rev. 1983); see also Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884) (retroac-
tive evidentiary change which altered "the mode in which the facts constituting guilt may
be placed before the jury" but did not "change the ingredients of the offence or the ulti-
mate facts necessary to establish guilt" held not to violate the ex post facto prohibition);
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 327-29 (1867) (imposing punishment upon
those unable to take oath that they had not taken arms against the Union creates a new
crime through a new method of proof, in effect, making it a crime not to be able to
manifest one's innocence through the prescribed method of proof); Ex Post Facto Limita-
tions, supra note 16, at 1515-16 & n.90 (proposing a method of ex post facto analysis that
"uphold[s] the long-standing conclusion that the clauses prohibit the retroactive applica-
tion of evidentiary changes that, in effect, alter the elements of an offense").
107. Among the federal courts of appeals that have construed the ex post facto clauses
in light of Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981), and Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282
(1977), there is a strong consensus that in order for a retroactive procedural change to be
substantive for ex post facto purposes, it must cause an increase in punishment. See
United States v. Alexander, 805 F.2d 1458, 1461 (11th Cir. 1986) (procedural change not
ex post facto if it does not increase punishment or change the ingredients of an offense);
United States v. Mest, 789 F.2d 1069, 1071 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 163
(1986); United States v. McCahill, 765 F.2d 849, 850 (9th Cir. 1985); ("The law [chal-
lenged] is procedural because it does not alter the quantum of punishment."); United
States v. Molt, 758 F.2d 1198, 1201 (7th Cir.) ("The presumption is against construing a
procedural change as an ex post facto law, and must carry the day [unless] the change
works an increase in punishment."), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 1458 (1985); United States v.
Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 21 (3d Cir. 1985) (ex post facto clauses "apply only to laws which
impose 'punishment'" (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981))); Dufresne v.
Baer, 744 F.2d 1543, 1546 (1lth Cir. 1984) (one of the characteristics of an ex post facto
law is that it is "disadvantageous to the offender because it may impose greater punish-
ment"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 61 (1985); Paschal v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1173, 1176
(1 1th Cir. 1984) (in order to be ex post facto, a law must be "disadvantageous to the
[defendant] because it may impose greater punishment.... A law which is merely proce-
dural and does not add to the quantum of punishment, however, cannot violate the ex
post facto clause even if it is applied retrospectively."). But a procedural change does not
cause an increase in punishment by increasing the statistical likelihood of conviction. See
United States v. McCahill, 765 F.2d 849, 850 (9th Cir. 1985).
Although "statutory changes that merely shift the balance of procedural advantages a
little against the defendant can be applied retroactively without becoming ex post facto
laws," Prater v. United States Parole Comm'n, 802 F.2d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 1986) (en
bane), a procedural change that lightens the prosecutor's burden too greatly might consti-
tute the type of legislative interference in the judicial process that the Framers sought to
prevent. Cf id. ("[One] purpose of forbidding ex post facto laws [is] that of keeping the
legislature from getting involved in the executive and judicial functions of prosecuting
and punishing past acts."). The question is "one of degree." See Beazell v. Ohio, 269
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retroactive procedural change will not be considered ex post facto unless
it acts in such a way as to bring it within one of the two fundamental
categories of ex post facto law.10 8
It seems impossible that the alteration of an evidentiary rule could
have any impact on the amount of punishment prescribed or given for a
criminal act. Rules of evidence relate solely to the establishment of a
defendant's criminal liability and do not apply in the process by which
actual sanctions are imposed. 0 9
An evidentiary change, however, could act in such a way as to change
the substantive nature of an offense. It could do so by admitting as proof
of the elements of an existing crime acts or circumstances that were be-
yond the scope of the pre-alteration definition of the crime. 10o The repeal
of an accomplice corroboration statute does not have this effect. The rule
does not apply to any particular substantive crime, but relates to the pro-
cedure in all trials where the sole witness is an accomplice. The corrobo-
U.s. 167, 171 (1925). The repeal of an accomplice corroboration requirement is a return
to the common law and majority rule, and since it actually increases the discretion of the
trial court, see infra note 160 and accompanying text, and does not single out any one
party or group, see Dufresne v. Baer, 744 F.2d 1543, 1549 (1 lth Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 61 (1985), it merely is a procedural change and is immune to challenge on ex
post facto grounds.
108. See United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir. 1985) ("If the change
is merely procedural and does not increase the punishment or change the elements of a
crime, it is not an ex post facto law."); supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. Inter-
pretation of the ex post facto prohibition as prohibiting only those retroactive procedural
laws that act in such a way as to bring them into one of the two fundamental categories of
ex post facto law gives meaning to the Supreme Court's dictum that "the legislature may
not, under the guise of establishing modes of procedure and prescribing remedies, violate
the accepted principles that protect an accused person against ex post facto enactments."
Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 590 (1896).
109. In Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), the Supreme Court wrote:
Tribunals passing on the guilt of a defendant always have been hedged in by
strict evidentiary procedural limitations. But both before and since the Ameri-
can colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a
policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the
sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and
extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law.
Id. at 246 (footnote omitted). Accomplice corroboration requirements come into play
solely during the process by which guilt or innocence is determined. See supra notes 71-
80 and accompanying text (discussing operation of accomplice corrobortion
requirements).
110. See 1 J. Wigmore, supra note 106, § 7, at 469 n.4; supra note 106; cf. Splawn v.
California, 431 U.S. 595, 599-601 (1977) (upholding a statutory change that allowed the
jury to infer the elements of obscenity violation from evidence of circumstances not previ-
ously admissible, but not reaching the ex post facto question); Cummings v. Missouri, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 327-29 (1867) (imposing punishment upon those unable to take oath
that they had not taken arms against the Union violates the ex post facto prohibition by
creating a new crime through a new method of proof, in effect, making it a crime not to
be able to manifest ones innocence through the prescribed method of proof); DeWoody
v. Superior Ct., 8 Cal. App. 3d 52, 56-57, 87 Cal. Rptr. 210, 212-13 (1970) (new law that
created a presumption of intoxication on the finding of a certain level of blood alcohol
held invalid as retroactively applied).
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ration requirement is not an element of any crime," I and its repeal does
not change the conduct considered culpable under the definition of the
substantive offense with which a defendant is charged." 2
An evidentiary change also may run afoul of the ex post facto prohibi-
tion if it increases the likelihood of conviction to such an extent as virtu-
ally to guarantee it. This seems to have been the Supreme Court's
concern in an early dictum that stated that retroactive evidentiary
changes madefor the purpose of conviction would violate the ex post facto
clause.1 13 But such a change more likely would be invalidated as a bill of
attainder than as an ex post facto law." 4 Repealing the corroboration
requirement increases the likelihood that a defendant will be convicted,
but does not do so with the degree of certainty or specificity as to raise it
to the level of a bill of attainder.
15
111. See People v. Spiegel, 60 A.D.2d 210, 212, 400 N.Y.S.2d 73, 75 (1977) (require-
ment of accomplice corroboration is not an element of the crime charged, but is merely
an added procedural device), aff'd, 48 N.Y.2d 647, 396 N.E.2d 472, 421 N.Y.S.2d 190
(1979); People v. Johnson, 46 A.D.2d 55, 58, 361 N.Y.S.2d 161, 163 (1974) (same), aff'd,
38 N.Y.2d 956, 348 N.E.2d 608, 384 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1976); People v. Luongo, 86 Misc. 2d
120, 125, 382 N.Y.S.2d 266, 269 (Suffolk County Ct. 1976) (same), modified on other
grounds, 58 A.D.2d 895, 397 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1977), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 418, 391 N.E.2d 1341,
418 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1979).
112. The prohibition of ex post facto laws is concerned with preventing the retroactive
criminalization of activities that were viewed as innocent at the time they were commit-
ted. See supra note 38. The presence or absence of a corroboration requirement does not
come into play until a defendant already has been indicted for the commission of a sub-
stantive offense of which she was on constructive notice. The conduct considered culpa-
ble and the facts from which such conduct may be inferred are the same whether the
corroboration requirement applies or not. It is absurd to assert that the removal of the
corroboration requirement criminalizes the commission of a crime when there is no evi-
dence other than the testimony of an accomplice.
113. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 305, 309, 3 Dall. 386, 390 (1798) ("[e]very law that
alters the legal rules of evidence.., in order to convict the offender" violates the ex post
facto prohibition (emphasis added)) (opinion of Chase, J.); id, 3 Dall. at 391 (law consid-
ered ex post facto within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition if it "changes the
rules of evidencefor the purpose of conviction." (emphasis added) (opinion of Chase, J.)).
This dictum seems to have been based on a faulty historical analogy. The Court dis-
cussed the case of Sir John Fenwick (1696) as an example of a time when the Parliament
had passed an ex post facto law altering the rules of evidence in order to convict. Actually
the Parliament had passed a bill of attainder convicting Fenwick without a judicial trial
because it lacked sufficient evidence to convict him in a court of law. A conviction for
treason then, as now, required the testimony of two witnesses, but the crown only had
one, Fenwick having effected the absence of another. See Z. Chafee, supra note 20, at
133-35; IV T. Macaulay, History of England 740-68 (1855). Thus, the concern over evi-
dentiary changes expressed in Calder seems to be related more to bills of attainder than
ex post facto laws.
114. The line between a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law can be a fine one. A
legislative act that so alters the substantive elements of a crime or the methods of proving
them as to guarantee conviction of a specific person or group of persons may run afoul of
both provisions. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 324-32 (1867) (find-
ing legislation invalid on both ex post facto and bill of attainder grounds); see also Ex Post
Facto Limitations, supra note 16, at 1514 & n.84; see generally supra note 20 (discussion
of bills of attainder).
115. The repeal of the accomplice corroboration requirement solely disadvantages
those defendants against whom the only evidence is the testimony of an accomplice.
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The retroactive repeal of an accomplice corroboration requirement
does not fall into any of the categories of legislative changes that clearly
would be considered substantive for ex post facto purposes: it does not
criminalize an action that was innocent when done,116 nor change the
elements of a crime,1 17 nor increase the punishment assigned to an ex-
isting offense,' 18 and does not deprive the defendant of a defense to which
she would have been entitled at the time she committed her crime.' 19 In
Whereas the guilt of such a defendant probably would not have been submitted to the
jury, see supra notes 77-78, after repeal, the jury must examine the evidence to decide
whether it can find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The constitutional prohibition of bills of attainder is meant to preserve the sanctity of
the judicial process. See supra note 20. In order to be considered a bill of attainder, a law
must operate as a legislative decree of the guilt of a specific person or group of persons.
See Nowak, Rotunda & Young, supra note 12, § 11.9(c), at 394. The repeal of an accom-
plice corroboration requirement does not guarantee the conviction of the defendants af-
fected, since the prosecution still bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. The repeal does not apply to any specified person or group of persons. See The
Bounds of Legislative Specification, supra note 20, at 330 (bill of attainder applies to a
specific person or group).
116. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589 (1884); supra note 38.
117. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884); supra note 38.
118. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589-90 (1884); supra note 39.
119. See Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925) (retroactive procedural change
that deprives a defendant of a defense violates the ex post facto prohibition); Thompson
v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 384 (1898) (same); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 229 (1883)
(same).
The term defense can refer, in its broadest sense, to any means by which a defendant
fights a guilty verdict. See Black's Law Dictionary 377-78 (5th ed. 1979). The argument
that a witness is an accomplice, whose uncorroborated testimony alone cannot sustain a
guilty verdict, might thus be considered a defense. The four dissenting justices in Kring
argued that a defense should be considered substantive for ex post facto purposes only if
it relates to the substantive elements of culpability for the criminal act itself and the
circumstances that attended the defendant's conduct. See Kring, 107 U.S. at 250-51
(Matthews, J., dissenting). According to the Kring dissenters, "defenses" that accrue as a
matter of mere procedure may be altered retroactively. See id. It appears that the Court
has since adopted this view, because it has upheld the withdrawal of other procedural
privileges that might have been classified under the broadest definition of defenses. See,
e.g., Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-71 (1925) (upholding the retroactive repeal of a
law which allowed co-felons to demand separate trials); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S.
380, 386-87 (1898) (upholding a retroactive change in the methods by which handwriting
evidence may be proved or disproved); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884) (uphold-
ing the retroactive repeal of law which had imposed absolute testimonial incompetency
on convicted felons). Deprivation of a substantive defense would effectively change the
elements of a crime. The dictum that the ex post facto clauses do not allow the retroac-
tive deprivation of a defense, see, e.g., Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925);
Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 384 (1898), thus relates to one of the fundamental
categories of ex post facto violation-changes in the substantive nature of an offense. See
supra note 38 and accompanying text.
According to the Kring dissent's definition, an accomplice corroboration requirement
would be considered a matter of procedure because it does not change, affect, or in any
way relate to the circumstances or elements of an alleged criminal act. See Kring, 107
U.S. 221, at 250-51 (1883) (Matthews, J., dissenting). The similarity between the repeal
of an accomplice corroboration requirement and the repeal of a statute barring the testi-
mony of convicted felons approved in Hopt, see Murphy v. Sowders, 801 F.2d 205, 208
(6th Cir. 1986), also suggests that it does not fall within the Kring definition of a defense,
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sum, the repeal of an accomplice corroboration requirement does not af-
fect any of the ultimate facts that must be proven to obtain a verdict of
guilty, 120 nor does it alter the consequences of such a verdict. 2' Re-
turning to the common law rule'22 merely changes the evidence that may
be considered by the jury in order to decide the relevant issues of fact.
In Hopt v. Utah 124 and Thompson v. Missouri,25 the Supreme Court up-
held similar retroactive evidentiary changes against ex post facto
challenge. 1
26
The only attack that can be made on retroactive application of the
especially since the Hopt case was decided only one year after Kring. If the right to
exclude a felon's testimony was considered a defense, so should the right not to be con-
victed on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
It also may be argued that the repeal of the accomplice corroboration requirement does
not deprive a defendant of the right to challenge the credibility of an accomplice witness
but merely changes the method by which she can do it. Cf United States v. Alexander,
805 F.2d 1458, 1462 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (holding that a retroactive change in the method of
asserting the insanity defense does not deprive defendant of a defense in violation of the
ex post facto prohibition).
120. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884).
121. Repeal of the accomplice corroboration requirement relates solely to the process
by which actual criminal liability is determined and has no impact on the sanctions that
may be imposed once a guilty verdict is reached. See supra note 109 and accompanying
text.
122. In undertaking its ex post facto analysis, the Court sometimes has considered the
nature and fairness of the challenged legislation without regard to its retrospective effect.
See e.g., Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 387 (1898) ("[n]or can the new rule ... be
characterized as unreasonable"). The fact that the repeal of an accomplice corroboration
requirement returns to the common law and majority method of handling accomplice
testimony suggests that it is not unjust or oppressive if applied retroactively. Cf Beazell
v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 (1925) ("The legislation here concerned restored a mode of
trial deemed appropriate at common law, with discretionary power in the court.... We
do not regard it as harsh or oppressive ....").
123. The words of the Supreme Court in Thompson are applicable here: "The statute
did nothing more than remove an obstacle arising out of a rule of evidence that withdrew
from the consideration of the jury testimony which, in the opinion of the legislature,
tended to elucidate the ultimate, essential fact to be established, namely, the guilt of the
accused." 171 U.S. at 387; see also Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595, 599-601 (1977)
(upholding a statutory change that allowed the jury to infer the elements of obscenity
violation from evidence of circumstances which previously had not been admissible; the
court did not reach the ex post facto question); Changes in Procedural Low, supra note
40, at 402 (retroactive changes which "affect only the manner of proving a fact which is
already an element of the crime charged" do not violate the ex post facto prohibition).
124. 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
125. 171 U.S. 380 (1898).
126. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text. The lower courts have upheld a
variety of evidentiary changes since the Dobbert decision. See, eg., Turley v. State, 356
So. 2d 1238, 1243-44 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) (upholding the retroactive application of a
statute which made evidence of prior sexual relations between accused rapist and victim
inadmissible); People v. Dorff, 77 Ill. App. 3d 882, 886-87, 396 N.E.2d 827, 828-30
(1979) (upholding retroactive application of law preventing introduction of evidence of
rape victim's past sexual history); People v. Smith, 56 A.D.2d 686, 688, 391 N.Y.S.2d
734, 737 (1977) (same); State v. Slider, 38 Wash. App. 689, 694-95, 688 P.2d 538, 542-43
(1984) (upholding retroactive application of law that made child abuse victim's testimony
admissible).
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repeal of an accomplice corroboration requirement is that it disadvan-
tages certain defendants.' 27 The Supreme Court has made clear that this,
in itself, does not mean that a retroactive procedural change violates the
ex post facto prohibition.'1 8 There is little else that may be offered to
rebut the presumption that the effect of the repeal of an accomplice cor-
roboration requirement is merely procedural, and thus, under Dobbert,
immune to attack on ex post facto grounds.'2 9
C. The Hopt Dictum
Although the Dobbert decision would seem to be controlling authority
for whether the repeal of an accomplice corroboration requirement vio-
lates the ex post facto clauses, neither the Civil nor the Murphy court
relied on it. Instead, both found Hopt controlling, though for different
reasons. 130 The Murphy court's analogy to the facts of Hopt seems
apt,' 3 ' and in relying on them, the Murphy majority reached a result that
127. The class of defendants affected by the change may be quite small. The accom-
plice corroboration requirement, because it changes the common law rule, is strictly con-
strued, see Cunningham v. State, 54 Ala. App. 656, 658, 312 So. 2d 62, 65 (Crim. App.
1975); Alldredge v. State, 45 Ala. App. 171, 175, 227 So. 2d 803, 805 (Crim. App. 1969),
and even very little additional evidence may satisfy the requirement. See Harris v. State,
420 So. 2d 812, 817 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); Mathis v. State, 414 So. 2d 151, 153 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1982). Therefore, only defendants against whom the prosecution has no evi-
dence other than an accomplice's testimony are affected. It may be questioned whether
such a case would be prosecuted, even in the absence of the corroboration requirement, or
whether a jury would be likely to convict.
128. It is well settled that mere detriment to a defendant is insufficient to support an ex
post facto challenge to a procedural change. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293
(1977) ("Even though it may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, a procedural
change is not ex post facto."); United States v. Crabtree, 754 F.2d 1200, 1202 (5th Cir.)
(paraphrasing same), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3528 (1985); Chilcott v. Orr, 747 F.2d 29, 34
(1st Cir. 1984) ("[P]rocedural changes in the law are not violative of the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the Constitution, even when the change affects such weighty matters as the
application of the death penalty." (citing Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977)). A
procedural change that increases the statistical likelihood that defendants will be con-
victed does not violate the ex post facto prohibition. See United States v. McCahill, 765
F.2d 849, 850 (9th Cir. 1985); Finney v. State, 179 Ind. App. 316, 321, 385 N.E.2d 477,
480-81 (1979).
129. See supra note 104.
130. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
131. See Murphy v. Sowders, 801 F.2d 205, 207 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1593 (1987). The Hopt decision addressed the repeal of a rule of competency, see Hopt v.
Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 588-90 (1884), but the accomplice corroboration requirement is not
such a rule. Hence the Murphy court's analogy to the Hopt facts may not literally be
accurate, but if the two repeals are compared in light of the purposes the Supreme Court
has enunciated for the ex post facto prohibition, the analogy appears apt. The Supreme
Court has identified three purposes for the ex post facto ban: ensuring fair warning, reli-
ance, and preventing legislative abuses. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
The extent to which either legislation impacts on these three factors would appear to be
exactly the same. In neither case does the alteration of the rule of evidence in any way
change the fact that a defendant was on constructive notice of the culpability of the crime
when she committed it. The interest that the defendant in either Hopt or Murphy reason-
ably might have had in relying on the repealed statute would seem to be identical. Fi-
nally, the extent that either repeal might have resulted from improperly motivated
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is in accord with the Supreme Court's ex post facto precedents, including
the Dobbert decision." 2 The Civil court's reliance on the dictum from
Hopt is semantically appealing,' 33 but there is little else to support the
result reached in that case.
The Hopt Court stated in dictum that "[a]ny statutory alteration of the
legal rules of evidence which would authorize conviction upon less proof,
in amount or degree, than was required when the offence was committed,
might, in respect of that offence, be obnoxious to the constitutional inhi-
bition upon ex post facto laws.' Whether this language refers to the
standard of proof or quantitative rules of evidence is a matter of
dispute. 135
legislation or been meant to harm a particular defendant or class of defendants, would
also seem to be the same.
132. Under Dobbert, there is a presumption that retroactive procedural changes are
not ex post facto. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 n.12 (1981); Dobbert v. Flor-
ida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 (1977); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884); United States v.
Molt, 758 F.2d 1198, 1201 (7th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 1458 (1986). The
Supreme Court's ex post facto cases rarely have invalidated retroactive procedural
changes, supra notes 43-44, and seem never to have invalidated a retroactive evidentiary
change. See supra notes 47-54. This suggests that the retroactive application of the re-
peal of an accomplice corroboration requirement would not violate the ex post facto
clause.
133. In a literal sense, the repeal of accomplice corroboration requirements does seem
to reduce the "amount" of evidence necessary to convict: conviction on the testimony of
one witness is allowed where one witness plus corroborating evidence would previously
have been required. See Murphy v. Sowders, 801 F.2d 205, 215 (6th Cir. 1986) (Brown,
J., dissenting), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 1593 (1987); Government of the Virgin Islands v.
Civil, 591 F.2d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 1979). It is questionable, however, whether the rule
really can be said to relate to the "quantity" of evidence necessary to convict. The notion
that one witness's testimony, be she accomplice or otherwise, is somehow a fixed unit of
evidence is absurd. Even if one witness's testimony could somehow be considered a fixed
quantity of evidence, under the accomplice corroboration requirement a defendant might
still have been convicted on the basis of this "quantity" of evidence, as long as the testi-
mony in question was not that of an accomplice in the crime charged.
134. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884). The dictum appears in several places in
the opinion in slightly different wordings. See id at 589-90. The words "quantity" and
"'amount" are interchanged. Id
In finding that a retroactive change in a rule of evidence did not violate the ex post
facto clause, the Supreme Court in Hopt contradicted its own earlier dictum. In Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. 305, 3 Dall. 386 (1798), the Court had stated that retroactive evidentiary
changes not only could but might necessarily be violative of the ex post facto clauses. See
id at 309, 3 Dall. at 390. Although the Hopt Court did not cite to the Calder opinion, it
doubtless was aware of the inconsistency of the result it was reaching. Thus, the prob-
lematic Hopt dictum may be seen as an attempt to redefine the earlier Calder dictum. In
Calder, Justice Chase had stated that "[e]very law that alters the legal rules of evidence,
and receives less, or different, testimony than the law required at the time of the commis-
sion of the offence, in order to convict the offender" is an ex post facto law. Id.
The Hopt decision effectively brought the Calder dictum into line with modern ex post
facto jurisprudence. See Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 387 (1898) (reciting the
Calder categories but leaving out the fourth, relating to rules of evidence); Smith v. State,
291 Ark. 163, 166, 722 S.W.2d 853, 856 (1987) (Supreme Court has departed from the
standard enunciated in Calder); 1 J. Wigmore, supra note 106, § 7, at 465 & nn.2, 3 & 4
(discussing modem status of the Calder dictum).
135. Compare Murphy v. Sowders, 801 F.2d 205, 209-10 (6th Cir. 1986) (language
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Although it is true that a statute decreasing the standard of proof in a
criminal case would be invalid on due process grounds whether it was
applied retrospectively or prospectively,136 a statute can run afoul of
more than one constitutional provision. 137 The operative question is not
whether the Hopt Court meant to refer to alterations in the standard of
proof. It surely did. The term "degree of proof" generally refers to the
standard of certainty to which guilt must be found-the standard of
proof.13 8 An examination of Supreme Court opinions during the ttopt
era reveals that this was the meaning the Court ascribed to the phrase,13 9
and the Supreme Court and lower courts have invalidated laws that ret-
roactively changed the burden or standard of proof. 140 Rather, the ques-
tion is whether the Court meant the phrase "amount [elsewhere quantity]
or degree of proof" to refer to something more than the mere standard of
refers to standard of proof), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1593 (1987) with id. at 214-16(Brown, J., dissenting) (language refers literally to quantity of evidence).
136. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970); Murphy v. Sowders, 801 F.2d 205,
216 (6th Cir. 1986) (Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1593 (1987).
137. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867) (in which a law was
found to violate the bill of attainder and ex post facto prohibitions). Indeed, the fourjustices who dissented in Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883), suggested that applica-
tion of the ex post facto laws to procedural matters was unnecessary in light of the many
explicit procedural protections elsewhere in the Constitution. See id. at 248-49 (Ma-
thews, J., dissenting). Similarly, in Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898), the Court
suggested that a retroactive procedural change would violate the ex post facto prohibition
if it infringed on any of the procedural protections that were considered important at the
time of the ratification of the Constitution, such as the right to a jury trial. See id. at 352.
Indeed, three of the early cases in which the ex post facto prohibition was used to invali-
date legislation might well be decided on other constitutional grounds were they to be
heard today. See Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898) (number of jurors); Kring v.
Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883) (double jeopardy); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 277 (1867) (due process).
138. See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 360(1984) (using the term in this sense); Adams v. South Carolina, 464 U.S. 1023, 1024(1983) (same); Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 95 (1981) (same); see also Black's Law
Dictionary 381 (5th ed. 1979) (degree of proof defined as "that measure of cogency re-
quired to prove a case depending upon the nature of the case. In a criminal case such
proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas in most civil cases such proof is by a
fair preponderance of the evidence.").
139. See, e.g., Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 90 (1905); Humes v. United States, 170
U.S. 210, 212 (1898); Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178, 188 (1897); White v. Van
Horn, 159 U.S. 3, 19 (1895).
140. See, e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 328 (1867) (penalty im-
posed on those who could not swear an oath that they had not participated in the Confed-
erate cause was ex post facto because, among other things, it subverted the presumption
of innocence and the burden of proof by compelling people to prove their own inno-
cence); DeWoody v. Superior Ct., 8 Cal. App. 3d 52, 56-57, 87 Cal. Rptr. 210, 212-13(1970) (new law that allowed a presumption of intoxication upon finding of a certain
blood-alcohol level could not be applied retroactively because it allowed conviction on
"less proof, in amount or degree," and reduced the prosecution's burden of proving every
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Moyer, 387 A.2d 194, 197(Del. 1978) (new statute that placed burden of proving extreme emotional distress, in
mitigation of a homicide charge, on the defendant was found to be invalid as retroactively
applied).
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proof; whether it meant to indicate that a retroactive change in a quanti-
tative rule of evidence violates the ex post facto prohibition.
True rules of quantity are very rare in the modem Anglo-American
system of evidentiary law. 4 ' Our method for overcoming the presump-
tion of innocence does not depend on the literal "amount" of evidence
presented, but rather requires that whatever quantity is presented be suf-
ficient for the jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 142 In contrast,
early civil law systems literally weighed the amounts of admissible evi-
dence presented for each side of a controversy.14 3 The oath of a witness
carried a certain inherent value and was worth the same amount whether
it was sworn in favor of one side or the other. No examination would be
made of the plausibility of a particular witness's testimony or whether
one witness was better situated to know the truth than another. Verdicts
were reached by counting the number of witnesses for each side.44
The few quantitative rules that exist in the American evidentiary sys-
tems, such as the several types of corroboration requirements145 and the
constitutional requirement of two witnesses for a treason conviction,'"
are not based on the notion of a literal weighing of the evidence, but are
minimum safeguards set up when the credibility of a certain type of evi-
dence is considered particularly suspect. 47 Such rules are anachronistic
and, to the extent that they still exist, on the wane.' 48 It would be strange
141. See Wigmore, Required Number of Witnesses; A Brief History of the Numerical
System in England, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 83, 83 (1901).
142. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970); Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S.
606, 608 (1945); Murphy v. Sowders, 801 F.2d 205, 210-11 (6th Cir. 1986); Brown v.
Davis, 752 F.2d 1142, 1144-45 (6th Cir. 1985); 7 J. Wigmore, supra note 62, § 2034; see
also 7 1. Wigmore, supra note 62, § 2032, at 333 (noting that English common law re-
jected the quantitative rules of evidence which were prevalent in the ecclesiastical law).
143. Evidentiary rules of quantity can be traced to the Bible. See Numbers 35:30 (New
King James) (Murder is a capital offense, but the death penalty may not be imposed
where only one witness has testified to the defendant's guilt); Deuteronomy 17:6 (New
King James) (testimony of two or three witnesses required for imposition of the death
penalty); John 8:17 (New King James) (" 'It is also written in your law that the testimony
of two men is true' (quoting Jesus)); I Timothy 5:19 (New King James) (accusations
against elders inadmissable unless from two or three witnesses); Hebrews 10:28 (New
King James) (prescribing death without mercy for those who, on the testimony of two or
three witnesses, have rejected the Mosaic Law). The primitive notion that the oath of a
witness has a certain weight, regardless of by whom sworn, is formalistic, and belongs to
the era of legal thought dominated by our barbarian and ecclesiastical ancestors. See
Wigmore, supra note 141, at 85-90 (describing the evolution of evidentary thought from
formalism to intellectualism).
144. See 7 J. Wigmore, supra note 62, §§ 2030-32. The weight of a witness's oath
could vary, as with the rule that a minimum of twelve or forty-four laymen's oaths were
required to outweigh that of a cardinal. See Wigmore, supra note 141, at 84.
145. See generally 7 J. Wigmore, supra note 62, §§ 2056-75 (describing the various
corroboration requirements).
146. See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 30 (1945); U.S. Cost. art. III, § 3.
147. See Murphy v. Sowders, 801 F.2d 205, 208 (6th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct.
1593 (1987); supra note 64 (discussing reasons for the suspicion of accomplice testimony).
148. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (modern evidentiary trend is away from
imposing testimonial barriers).
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for the Hopt Court, and all of the courts that have quoted its dictum
since,149 to have been particularly concerned with the effects of changes
to such an obscure class of statutes.15
0
D. Purposes of the Ex Post Facto Prohibition
Finding that the retroactive application of the repeal of an accomplice
corroboration requirement does not violate the ex post facto clauses is
consistent with the goals and purposes of the constitutional prohibition.
The ex post facto ban assures the citizen fair warning and reasonable
reliance, and restrains the legislature from improperly interfering in the
judicial process. 151
The retroactive repeal of an accomplice corroboration requirement
does not violate the interest that all citizens have in receiving fair warn-
ing as to what acts society regards as criminal, and the extent to which it
will punish these acts, 152 so that they may choose their actions in reliance
149. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294 (1977); supra note 87.
150. The Supreme Court has, on the other hand, expressed strong concern about retro-
active legislative changes that might alter the burden or standard of proof. See Thomp-
son v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 388 (1898) (in finding that a retroactive evidentiary change
did not violate the ex post facto prohibition, the Court stated: "If, for instance, the stat-
ute had taken from the jury the right to determine the sufficiency or effect of the evidence
which [the new statute] made admissible, a different question would have been
presented."); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589-90 (1884) (retroactive alteration of the
degree of proof necessary to convict would violate the ex post facto prohibition); see also
Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129, 1135-36 (6th Cir. 1980) (retroactive application of new
rule that affirmative defenses must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence held
invalid on due process grounds), rev'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); United
States v. Williams, 475 F.2d 355, 356-57 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (shift in burden of proof in
insanity defense may not be applied retroactively).
Interpreting the Hopt dictum to prohibit the retroactive repeal of an accomplice cor-
roboration requirement would also be inconsistent with the tone of the Hopt opinion, and
with Dobbert, in which the dictum was most recently quoted. See Dobbert v. Florida,
232 U.S. 282, 294 (1977). In Dobbert, as in Hopt, the Supreme Court imposed a restric-
tive standard for the application of the ex post facto prohibition to procedural changes.
The following passage from Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380 (1898) adds weight to
the interpretation of the Hopt dictum as referring to the burden and standard of proof:
The [challenged] statute did not require 'less proof, in amount or degree,' than
was required at the time of the commission of the crime charged upon [the
defendant]. It left unimpaired the right of the jury to determine the sufficiency
or effect of the evidence declared to be admissible, and did not disturb the fun-
damental rule that the State, as a condition of its right to take the life of an
accused, must overcome the presumption of his innocence and establish his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.... [T]he duty of the jury ... was the same
after as before the passage of the statute.
Id. at 387.
151. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981); Ex Post Facto Limitations,
supra note 16, at 1496-98, 1500-01; supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
152. See Inglese v. United States Parole Comm'n, 768 F.2d 932, 934 (7th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 21 (3d Cir. 1985); Dufresne v. Baer, 744 F.2d 1543,
1546 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 61 (1985); Warren v. United States Parole
Comm'n, 659 F.2d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982).
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thereon.'53 Trial of a defendant without the evidentiary protection of an
accomplice corroboration statute does not change the fact that she was
on constructive notice' 54 of the criminal nature of her action and the
degree to which society would seek to punish it. The repeal of the rule
does not act to deprive a defendant of notice of any of the essential ele-
ments in the system of criminal deterrence.' Although there are cer-
tain evidentiary rules that are meant to induce reliance on the part of the
general public, such as the privileges accorded to certain types of com-
munication,' 56 the corroboration requirement is not such a rule.' 57
153. In his dissent in Splawn v. California, Justice Stevens wrote:
The Ex Post Facto Clause 'reflect[s] the strong belief of the Framers of the Con-
stitution that men should not have to act at their peril, fearing always that the
State might change its mind and alter the legal consequences of their past acts
so as to take away their lives, their liberty or their property.'
Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595, 605 n.4 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting El
Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)). See Prater v. United
States Parole Comm'n, 802 F.2d 948, 952 (7th Cir. 1986) (en banc); United States v.
Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 951 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987); Dufresne
v. Baer, 744 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. CL 61 (1985); Warren
v. United States Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 950 (1982); supra note 36.
154. In Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977), the Supreme Court upheld the sen-
tence of capital punishment on a defendant whose crimes were committed under a death
penalty statute that was later found unconstitutional. See id. at 288-91. By the time of
the defendant's trial, the invalid statute had been replaced by one that met constitutional
standards. See id. The Court upheld the defendant's conviction and sentencing under
this later statute, holding that, because there was a law in effect at the time of the crime
that defined the offense and prescribed the penalty for it, he was on constructive notice of
the consequences of his action. See id. at 297-98, 303 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
155. See supra note 154. Defendants generally do not act in reliance on obscure proce-
dural rules. See Prater v. United States Parole Comm'n, 802 F.2d 948, 953 (7th Cir.
1986) (en banc); Prater v. United States Parole Comm'n, 764 F.2d 1230, 1233-34, vacated
and rehearing en banc granted, 775 F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Molt, 758
F.2d 1198, 1200 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1458 (1986); see also Smith v.
State, 291 Ark. 163, 168, 722 S.W.2d 853, 858 (1987) (no right to rely on a rule of evi-
dence; changes in evidentiary rules are to be judged only on "whether they are fairly
designed to get at the truth"). It is hard to imagine how a criminal could tailor her
actions in reliance on the accomplice corroboration requirement (because a criminal nat-
urally would attempt to minimize the amount of evidence), and even if a criminal could
do so, such reliance would not be reasonable. See Ex Post Facto Limitations, supra note
16 at 1508. The Supreme Court has stated in other constitutional contexts that the "de-
sire to escape criminal prosecution.., while understandable, is hardly deserving of con-
stitutional protection." See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972) (first
amendment). The rule that procedural changes are not subject to the ex post facto prohi-
bition itself puts citizens on notice that they may be altered retroactively and thus should
not be relied on. See Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 593 (1901); see also Prater
v. United States Parole Comm'n, 802 F.2d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (comment-
ing on the circularity of reliance analysis in relation to the ex post facto clauses: "[t]he
more narrowly the principle is defined, the fewer expectations are reasonable; the more
broadly it is defined, the more are reasonable").
156. See McCormick on Evidence § 72, at 171-72 (3d ed. E. Cleary ed. 1984); 8 J.
Wigmore, Evidence § 2285, at 527 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961); Ex Post Facto Limita-
tions, supra note 16, at 1513.
157. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 n.21 (1967) ("[Tmestimonial privileges
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The retroactive repeal of an accomplice corroboration requirement is
not the type of capricious or vindictive legislative action that is repug-
nant to the ex post facto prohibition. The change merely represents a
return to the majority and common law rule'58 and is applied equally in
all criminal trials. It does not "single out" any particular person or
group, and as such, it is not subject to abuse as a means of political op-
pression or retribution.159 Return to the common law rule actually di-
minishes the participation of the legislature in the process of
adjudication. The treatment of accomplice testimony is returned to the
discretion of the judge and jury,"6 who are granted broader power to
decide the outcome of a case on the basis of all available evidence.
CONCLUSION
The retroactive application of the repeal of accomplice corroboration
statutes is simply a procedural change and as such does not constitute ex
post facto legislation within the meaning of the constitutional prohibi-
tion. Although dicta in Supreme Court opinions have led to a contrary
finding in some lower courts, analysis of the Court's cases reveals that the
retroactive deprivation of the corroboration requirement does not rise to
the level of a constitutional violation. This finding is consistent with the
policies and rights protected by the ex post facto ban.
Derek J. T Adler
... are based on entirely different considerations from those underlying the common-law
disqualifications for interest.").
158. See supra note 62 (no accomplice corroboration requirement at common law) &
410 (only 18 United States jurisdictions have accomplice corroboration statutes). The
fact that the repeal causes reversion to the common law and majority rule suggests that
the legislature is not improperly motivated in repealing the accomplice corroboration
requirement. See Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 (1925) (return to common law rule is
not oppressive).
159. See Dufresne v. Baer, 744 F.2d 1543, 1549 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 61 (1985).
160. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (ex post facto clauses prevent improper
interference of the legislatures in the judicial process). The accomplice corroboration
requirement leaves no discretion to the trial court, and can prevent the conviction of an
accused person even if the jury is convinced to a moral certainty of her guilt. See People
v. Bowley, 59 Cal. 2d 855, 857-58, 382 P.2d 591, 593, 31 Cal. Rptr. 471, 473 (1963); see
also Prater v. United States Parole Comm'n, 764 F.2d 1230, 1234 (new parole guidelines
do not "preclude or severely limit the exercise of discretion and therefore do not operate
as ex post facto laws"), vacated and rehearing en banc granted, 775 F.2d 1157 (7th Cir.
1985) (en banc).
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